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ARGUMENT 
The arguments contained in this Reply Brief are limited to 
those issues raised on Cross-Appeal by Defendants Sam Peebles and 
Harold Peebles.1 
I. THE JURY ERRED IN FINDING THAT BROOKSIDE'S REFUSAL TO 
ALLOW MS. SOUTHWORTH TO SUBMIT AN APPLICATION FOR 
RESIDENCY WAS NOT UNREASONABLE 
The jury erred in finding that Brookside's refusal to accept 
an application for residency from Ms. Southworth was not an 
1
 Appellant raises two new issues in its reply brief. 
Appellant first argues that "Sam Peebles refused to sign a 
written lease with Brookside, as required by the [Mobile Home 
Park Residency Act]," and therefore he should be denied "the 
benefits provided by the Act." (Appellant's Reply Brief at 10) 
(citation omitted). The record shows, however, that the only 
reason Sam Peebles declined to sign a third lease with the Park 
is because he had also signed two previous leases. (Question: 
"Did you refuse to sign a new lease?" Peebles: "I never was 
presented one. [Jim Prentice] asked me if I would sign one. I 
told him I don't see why I need to. I'm already paying rent and 
I'm already under a lease so I never was presented with one 
again." Sam Peebles Dep. At 3 6.) The record also shows that the 
jury found that Peebles had a written lease for space #100 that 
had never been surrendered. Moreover, because Appellant did not 
raise this issue below or in its initial brief to this Court, the 
issue is waived. 
Appellant next argues that section 57-16-15.1 applies to 
this case. (Appellant's Reply Brief at 15.) That section, 
however, applies only to nonpayment of rent following a notice 
pursuant to section 57-16-6(2)(d), and to behavior that 
"substantially endangers" the "security and health" of other 
residents. The complaint did not seek evictions on section 57-
16-6(2) (d) grounds. No notice pursuant to 57-16-6(2) (d) was 
served. And no evidence on this basis was presented at trial. 
In short, section 57-16-15.1 is inapplicable and, even if it was 
applicable, the issue is waived because Appellant failed to raise 
the issue below or in its initial brief to this Court. 
1 
"unreasonable withholding'' of approval of residency under the 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act. As a matter of law, refusal to 
accept an application for residency from a prospective resident 
is a per se violation of section 57-16-4(4), which prohibits a 
mobile home park owner from "unreasonably withholding" approval 
for residency. 
In its Reply Brief, Brookside does not dispute that Jim 
Prentice, the Brookside mobile home park manager, refused to 
accept an application for residency from Jackie Southworth or 
that he refused to meet with her. Ms. Southworth had made an 
appointment to meet with Jim Prentice, fill out an application 
for residency and review her financial information, among other 
things. When she arrived, Jim Prentice testified that he "told 
her she had been denied by the owner" and he sent her away. (T. 
at 616, lines 18-19.) 
Brookside made the following arguments in its Reply Brief as 
to why the foregoing was not an "unreasonable withholding" of 
approval for residency within meaning of section 57-16-6. First, 
Brookside argued that Western Credit could not verify Ms. 
Southworth's employment income and therefore, presumably, 
Brookside had no duty to meet with Ms. Southworth or permit her 
to fill out an application. Second,' Brookside claimed that Jim 
Prentice testified that he did not "see" Ms. Southworth's tax 
2 
returns with her at the time he advised her that she had been 
denied residency by the owner of the park. Third, Brookside 
contended that Peebles failed to preserve this issue at trial 
because Peebles did not introduce Ms. Southworth's tax returns 
into evidence. Finally, Brookside asserted that Peebles failed 
to sufficiently "marshal the evidence." None of these arguments 
is sufficient to refute Defendants' argument that Brookside's 
actions constituted an "unreasonable withholding" within the 
meaning of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
A. Western Credit's Inability To Verify Ms. 
Southworth's Employment Does Not Justify Brookside's 
Refusal To Allow Ms. Southworth The Opportunity To 
Submit Her Financial Information To Brookside 
Brookside cites to portions of the trial transcript wherein 
Ms. Southworth acknowledges that Western Reporting was unable to 
verify her employment or her account with Utah First Credit.2 
Nevertheless, just because Western Credit was unable to verify 
Ms. Southworth's employment, Ms. Southworth should not have been 
prevented from submitting her financial information to Brookside. 
Ms. Southworth owned her own business. Ms. Southworth testified 
2
 "In the testimony of Ms. Southworth, she acknowledged that 
her credit report from Western Reporting states that Western 
Reporting was unable to verify her employment though the 
employment was at a company she owned." (Appellant's Reply Brief 
at 18) (citation omitted). "Ms. Southworth also acknowledged 
that her credit report from Western Reporting indicate [sic] that 
Western Reporting was unable to verify her account at Utah First 
Credit." Id. at 19 (citation omitted). 
3 
that "I would not allow any of my bank, or person [nel] to verify 
anything to anyone without [the] okay from me." (T. at 3 07, 
lines 23-24.) Because Ms. Southworth would not allow any of her 
banks or personnel to verify anything without her okay, she was 
prepared to "verify [her income] by tax returns at any time." 
(T. at 3-0 8, lines 4-5.) Furthermore, at the time Ms. Southworth 
went to meet: with Jim Prentice, she had the credit information 
with her and she was prepared to discuss it with Jim Prentice: 
Q. You said that you'd had with you the credit information 
we looked at? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. And were you going to review that with [Jim Prentice]? 
A. Yes, I was, as well as fill out the application for the 
park. 
Q. Okay. And you didn't have an opportunity to do that? 
A. I never got my foot in the door. 
(T. at 313, lines 10-18.) 
Brookside makes the very point that Peebles is making. 
Western Credit could not verify Ms. Southworth's financial 
information. Ms. Southworth should have had the opportunity to 
provide Brookside her credit information. Ms. Southworth stood 
ready and willing to provide that credit information, but Ms. 
Southworth had already been "denied by the owner." It was 
unreasonable for Brookside to reject Ms. Southworth based solely 
4 
on Western Credit's lack of verification. It is undisputed that 
Jim Prentice refused to meet with Ms. Southworth, refused to take 
an application from Ms. Southworth, and refused to allow Ms. 
Southworth to present her financial information. Such behavior 
constitutes a per se "unreasonable withholding" of approval for 
residency under section 57-16-4(4) of the Mobile Home Park 
Residency .Act. 
B. Prentice's Testimony That He Did Not See Ms. 
Southworth's Tax Returns In Her Hand Is Irrelevant 
Mr. Prentice's testimony that he did not see Ms. 
Southworth's tax returns in her hand is irrelevant. What Ms. 
Southworth may have had in her hand and what Mr. Prentice saw (or 
didn't see) in her hand is irrelevant since Ms. Southworth had 
already been "denied by the owner" as a resident of the mobile 
home park. (T. at 616, line 18.) Therefore, it is irrelevant 
what papers Ms. Southworth had with her since she had already 
been denied. Furthermore, because Jim Prentice refused to meet 
with Ms. Southworth, he had no opportunity to see what papers she 
had with her or what papers she could provide at a later time. 
Ms. Southworth also testified that she could "verify [her income] 
by tax returns at any time." (T. at 308, lines 4-5.) 
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C. Peebles Was Not Required To Tender Ms. Southworth's 
Tax Returns Into Evidence To Prove Brookside 
"Unreasonably Withheld" Approval For Residency 
Within The Meaning Of Section 57-16-6 
Brookside argues that u[t]he Peebles did not tender Ms. 
Southworth's tax returns into evidence to rebut Brookside's basis 
for denying her application and so the issues [sic] has [sic] not 
been preserved on appeal." (Appellant's Reply Brief at 20.) 
Neither of these arguments is true. 
i. The information on Ms. Southworth's tax returns is 
irrelevant 
Brookside argues that "Pebbles did not tender Ms. 
Southworth's tax returns into evidence to rebut Brookside's basis 
for denying her application." (Appellant's Reply Brief at 20.) 
(Emphasis added). This argument makes no sense. First, Ms. 
Southworth was never permitted to fill out an application for 
residency; so there was no "application" to deny. 
Second, the "basis" for Brookside denying Ms. Southworth the 
opportunity to fill out an application was Western Credit's 
inability to verify Ms. Southworth's employment. Alan Glover, 
the owner of the Park, testified that he had rejected Ms. 
Southworth because Western Credit had been "unable to verify 
employment." (T. at 70.) 
Accordingly, the "basis" for Brookside rejecting Ms. 
Southworth had nothing to do with Ms. Southworth's tax returns or 
6 
other financial information. Ms. Southworth's tax returns were 
irrelevant. This is demonstrated by the fact that Brookside 
would not even consider Ms. Southworth's tax returns or other 
financial information. Brookside did not care. Ms. Southworth's 
income or assets did not matter to Brookside. Brookside's 
decision was based not on Ms. Southworth's actual financial 
condition, but on what Western Credit could "verify." 
Furthermore, had Peebles tendered Ms. Southworth's actual 
tax returns, bank statements and financial statements into 
evidence at trial, as Brookside argues Peebles should have done, 
those documents would have been properly excluded as 
uirrelevant." 
ii. Peebles was not required to tender Ms. 
Southworth's tax returns into evidence to 
preserve for appeal the issue of whether 
Brookside had "unreasonably withheld" approval 
As discussed above, Peebles was not required to tender Ms. 
Southworth's tax return into evidence since that information was 
irrelevant to Brookside's rejection of Ms. Southworth. Brookside 
refused to even meet with Ms. Southworth or to review any of her 
financial information, be it tax returns or otherwise that she 
might have provided to them. Furthermore, Estate of Morrison v. 
West One Trust Co., 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), which 
7 
Brookside cites in its Reply Brief,3 is inapposite. Estate of 
Morrison was an estate case. 933 P.2d at 1016 (providing 
background of case). It had nothing to with a mobile home park. 
Moreover, unlike Estate of Morrison, Defendants in this case have 
not "introduce[d] . . . entirely new arguments" on appeal. Id. 
at 1018. Rather, the issues which Defendants raise here and 
elsewhere have been preserved for appeal and they are therefore 
correctly before this Court. 
D. Peebles Has Marshaled The Evidence 
Finally, Brookside asserts that Pebbles has failed to 
marshal the evidence. This is not true. Peebles has marshaled 
the evidence. In its Opposing Memorandum, Brookside has failed 
to cite a single piece of evidence that is inconsistent with 
Peebles' theory of this case. It is undisputed that Brookside 
refused to meet with Ms. Southworth or accept an application from 
her. It is also undisputed that Ms. Southworth stood ready and 
willing to provide her tax returns and other financial 
information to Brookside. 
The Mobile Home Park Residency Act provides that "approval" 
of a prospective purchaser of a mobile home who intends to become 
a resident may not be "unreasonably withheld." For Brookside to 
3
 See Appellant's Reply Brief at 20 (citing Estate of 
Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah [Ct.] App. 1997)). 
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refuse to even meet with or accept an application from a 
prospective purchaser is "unreasonable" as a matter of law. 
Brookside's actions in this case attempt to override the 
overall purpose of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, which 
states: 
The fundamental right to own and protect 
land and to establish conditions for its 
use by others necessitate[s] that the 
owner of a mobile home park be provided 
with speedy and adequate remedies 
against those who abuse the terms of a 
tenancy. The high cost of moving mobile 
homes, the requirement of mobile home 
parks relating to their installation, 
and the cost of landscaping and lot 
preparation necessitate that the owners 
of mobile homes occupied within mobile 
home parks be provided with protection 
from actual or constructive eviction. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to 
provide protection for both the owners 
of mobile homes located in mobile home 
parks and . . . the owners of mobile 
home parks. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-2 (1994) (emphasis added.); see also 
Coleman v. Thomas, 2000 UT 53, ^19, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 
(recognizing that the Mobile Home Park Residency Act serves the 
twofold purpose of protecting park residents and park owners). 
The Act specifically recognizes "the high cost of moving mobile 
homes." In this case, Brookside rejected Ms. Southworth, the 
third prospective purchaser who Peebles brought to the park. As 
a result, Sam Peebles lost a sale of his mobile home for $25,000 
9 
in September, 1996. (See. Appellees' Brief at 10, line 36.) Sam 
Peebles continued to pay lot rent, even though the Mobile Home 
was vacant and Brookside had rejected three prospective 
purchasers, including Jackie Southworth. 
Finally, in November, 1997, over one year after Ms. 
Southworth's rejection, the Mobile Home was finally sold and 
moved to Evanston, Wyoming at a net profit of $1,423.50. 
(Appellees' Brief at 11, line 43) (citation omitted).4 This 
excludes the additional $3,177.00 in lot rent Sam Pebbles had to 
pay from October 25, 1996 through November 20, 1997.5 
The prohibition against "unreasonably withholding" approval 
for applications for residency by prospective purchasers, which 
is set forth in section 57-16-4(4), was designed to protect 
mobile home owners from the "high cost" of arbitrary and 
capricious refusal by mobile home park owners such as Brookside. 
It cost Brookside so little to be reasonable. It cost Sam 
Peebles a great deal. Instead of selling his home for $25,000 in 
4
 CJL. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992) 
(stating that "[t]he term 'mobile home' is somewhat misleading. 
Mobile homes are largely immobile as a practical matter, because 
the cost of moving one is often a significant fraction of the 
value of the mobile home itself."). 
5
 October 25, 1996 was the closing date under the Real 
Estate Purchase Contract between Peebles and Jackie Southworth 
(Trial Exhibit D-67.) November 20, 1997 was the day the Mobile 
Home was finally moved from the Park. 
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October, 1996, he had to move it to Evanston, Wyoming and sold it 
for a net profit of $1,422.50 in November, 1997, plus he had to 
continue to pay lot rent on space #100 from October, 1996 through 
November, 1997. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The trial court erred in denying Defendants' Motion for 
Costs and Attorney's Fees. Section 57-16-8 of the Utah Code 
provides that " [i]f a resident elects to contest an eviction 
proceeding,...[t]he prevailing party is... entitled to court 
costs and reasonable attorney's fees." Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-8 
(1994) . 
A. Peebles was a "resident" within the meaning of Section 
57-16-8 because he "was an individual that leases or 
rents space in a mobile home park." 
Section 57-16-3(3) defines "resident" as "an individual that 
leases or rents space in a mobile home park." In Brookside's 
Reply Brief, Brookside does not argue that Sam Peebles was not 
paying rent for space #100. In fact, Brookside's Exhibit A to 
its Reply Brief (when the omitted second page is included) makes 
that matter all the clearer. (Brookside's Exhibit A to its Reply 
Brief, with the omitted second page, is attached hereto as 
Appendice A.) After Peebles' sublessee, Richard Rowley, 
abandoned the Mobile Home, Sam Peebles made the following 
11 
payments to Brookside for space #100, prior to service of the 5-
day Notice to Quit. The following information is taken from 
Brookside's own accounting ledger (attach as Appendice E to 
Appellees' Brief) and the omitted second page from Brookside's 
Exhibit A to its Reply Brief (attached hereto as Appendice A.): 
Date Amount 
October 31, 1995 $591.00 (two months) 
December 11, 1995 $215.00 
January 3, 1996 $215.00 
February 5, 1996 $215.00 
March 5, 1996 $215.00 
April 5, 1996 $235.00 
May 5, 1996 $235.00 
Thus, at the time the 5-Day Notice to Quit was served (August 10, 
1996), Sam Peebles was current on rent for lot #100.6 He had 
been paying monthly lot rent since October, 1995. Although the 
April 5, 1996 rent check was not cashed at that time because of 
the service of the eviction notice, it had nevertheless been 
tendered. 
B. The Complaint seeking to evict Peebles was an ''eviction 
proceeding" within the meaning of Section 57-16-8 
Furthermore, this was clearly "an eviction proceeding" 
6
 Brookside did not cash the April 5, 1996 check or 
subsequent checks until Brookside and Peebles agreed in December, 
1996, that Brookside could do so. Although the checks subsequent 
to May 5, 1996 are not listed above, it is undisputed that all 
rents due and owing Brookside while the Mobile Home occupied 
space #100 were paid by Peebles. (See Appellees' Brief at 12, 
paragraph 44.) 
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within the meaning of section 57-16-8. (Compare Appellees' Brief 
at 51-52, with Appellant's Reply Brief (providing no response to 
this point)). 
Brookside's only argument that Peebles is not entitled to 
attorney's fees is that Peebles' argument for attorney's fees and 
Peebles' argument against Brookside's request for attorney's fees 
are inconsistent: 
In their brief the Peebles first argue in section IV of 
their brief that Brookside is not entitled to recovery 
of attorney's fees in defending against the Peebles 
counterclaim under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act 
because Brookside's eviction proceeded under the 
Unlawful Detainer Act. The Peebles then argue the 
opposite in section V of their brief that even though 
Brookside proceeded to evict the Peebles under the 
Unlawful Detainer Act, dismissal of such claim by the 
trial court results in recovery of their attorney's 
fees under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
(Appellant's Reply Brief at 20-21) (citations omitted). 
The foregoing is Brookside's entire argument against awarding 
Peebles his attorney's fees for successfully defending against 
the eviction action. This argument is flawed. As to the 
counterclaim, regardless of who the prevailing party is, there is 
no basis for the prevailing party to recover attorney's fees for 
the counterclaim. (See Appellees' Brief at 46-52.) 
As to the complaint, under Brookside's eviction theory, 
Brookside is not entitled to attorney's fees if it prevails. 
Brookside argues that Sam Peebles was a "tenant at will" within 
13 
the meaning of the Unlawful Detainer Act. The Unlawful Detainer 
Act, however, does not include an attorney's fees clause. 
Therefore, if Brookside is successful in proving that Sam Peebles 
was a "tenant at will" under the Unlawful Detainer Act, there is 
no basis for Brookside to recover attorney's fees. 
If Sam Peebles successfully defends against the Complaint, 
then Peebles is entitled to attorneys fees under Section 57-16-8 
if he is a "resident" and if this is an "eviction proceeding." 
As discussed above, Sam Peebles is a "resident" within the 
meaning of section 57-16-8, and this is an "eviction proceeding." 
Since Peebles prevailed on the complaint below, the trial court 
errored in failing to award Peebles his attorneys fees under 
section 57-16-8.7 
7
 Although not required to recover attorneys fees, Peebles 
was also an "owner" of the Mobile Home. (See the title to the 
Mobile Home, attached as Appendice A to Appellees' Brief.) In 
Brookside's first brief, Brookside alleged that Peebles sold his 
mobile home to Richard Rowley. (See Appellant's Brief at 6 
(stating that "[t]he Peebles then sold the home to Richard Rowley 
. . . .")). In Brookside's second brief, Brookside recanted that 
allegation, acknowledging that Peebles only rented his mobile 
home to Richard Rowley. (See Appellant's Reply Brief at 1 
(stating that "the Peebles had rented the mobile home to Richard 
Rowley with an option to purchase . . . . " ) ; id. at 2 (stating 
that "in renting their mobile home to Richard Rowley . . . . " ) . 
As reviewed in footnote 2, page 6 of Appellees' Brief, Sam 
Peebles never sold the Mobile Home to Richard Rowley. Peebles 
was always an owner of the mobile home. Alan Glover, owner of 
Brookside, acknowledged at trial that "Sam Peebles was in fact 
the owner of the home." (T. at 50, lines 4-5.) In approximately 
1987, Peebles did sell the mobile home on an installment contract 
(without transferring title) to Bud Jones and Barbara Peacock, 
14 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should overturn the jury verdict and find that 
Brookside's refusal to meet with or even accept an application 
for residency from Ms. Southworth is a per se violation of 
section 57-16-4(4) of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, which 
provides that approval of a prospective purchaser for residency 
may not be "unreasonably withheld." 
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of 
Defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees for successfully defending 
the eviction action, and remand this case for a determination 
consistent therewith, including a determination of Defendants' 
attorney's fees on appeal for successfully defending on appeal 
the trial court's dismissal of the eviction action. 
Finally, this Court should uphold the remainder of the 
Court's rulings in this case. 
DATED t h i s 3\ d a y of J u l y , 2 0 0 0 . 
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L . C . 
Russell A. Cline 
Attorney for Appellees 
however, they defaulted after about 6 months and Sam Peebles took 
back the mobile home and signed a new lease with the Park. 
(Appellees' Brief at 6, lines 8-10) (citation omitted). 
Thereafter Peebles only subleased the mobile home. 
15 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Reply Brief of Appellees have been mailed postage pre-
paid on this ^( day of July, 2000 to the following: 
Dennis K. Poole 
John L. Adams 
Poole, Sullivan & Adams, L.C. 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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APPENDICE A 
(Exhibit A lo Reply of Appellant, 
with omitted second page) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
DENNIS K. POOLE, P.C. 
ANDREA NUFFER GODFREY 
December 4, 1996 
4543 SOUTH 700 EAST, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
TELEPHONE (801) 263-3344 
TELECOPIER (801) 263-1010 
Mr. Russell A. Cline 
CRIPPEN & CLINE 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Sam Peebles 
Dear Mr. Cline: 
This letter will confirm the stipulation made in Court this 
date that Brookside Mobile Home Park will negotiate the checks 
tendered by Mr. Peebles for monthly rent without prejudice to the 
rights of the parties. 
I am enclosing herewith for your reference copies of the 
checks which we have been holding and which we are forwarding to 
Brookside to deposit. You should be aware that as of December 1, 
1996 a total of $2,115.00 is due and owing for rent. After 
applying the checks we are holding, which total $1,370.00, there is 
a balance of $745.00. Unless we receive this amount in full within 
the next ten (10) days, we will file a Motion for Summary Judgment 
based upon the failure to pay the lot rental. 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. 
\ Very^ruly yours, 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
DKP:ec 
Enc. 
cc: Brookside Mobile Home Park, w/checks 
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